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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Massachusetts Supreme Court's determination that
the state's refusal to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples violates
the Massachusetts Constitution,' a lively and heated debate about the role
of marriage in American society has taken center stage While the debate
tends to focus on the symbolic meaning of marriage and its importance as
a social institution with deep historical roots, 3 proponents of same-sex
marriage also point out that marriage is a significantly important bundle
of legal rights. The ability to marry grants couples a preferential status4
under federal,5 state,6 and local law.7 Currently, over 1600 combined
1. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309 (Mass. 2003); and subsequent Feb.
3, 2004 Advisory Opinion, 440 Mass, 1201 (Mass. 2004). For a concise summary of other recent
international and domestic developments that demonstrate the law's persistent movement toward
broader recognition of same-sex relationships, see Developments in the Law: 1. Inching Down the
Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and
Europe, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2004, 2004-06 (2004).
2. See, e.g., Raphael Lewis, Weighing Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2004, at
A12; Jack B. Harrison, Taking Marriage Seriously, NEW JERSEY L.J., Feb. 2, 2004; Marcia Coyle,
Each Bloc Devises its Legal Strategy on Gay Marriage, RECORDER, Nov. 26, 2003, at 3.
3. David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences ofMarriage and the Legal Needs
ofLesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REv. 447,450 (1996) ("In our country, as in most
societies throughout the world, marriage is the single most significant communal ceremony of
belonging. It marks not just ajoining of two people, but ajoining of families and an occasion for
tribal celebration and solidarity").
4. Gay rights advocates and scholars argue that the landmark ruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896) should apply to marriage rights as well, and that any separate arrangement, such
as civil unions, fails to meet constitutional muster. See Danaya C. Wright, The Logic and
Experience of Law: Lawrence v. Texas and the Politics of Privacy, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
423 (2004).
5. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), was signed into law in 1996 and declares, that
under federal law, marriage will be defined as a "union between one man and one woman." The
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rights,8 benefits, and obligations hinge on the ability to assume the status
of marriage. The specific rights and benefits included in this figure vary
in their significance, scope, and everyday notoriety. Most Americans
understand that certain tax benefits9 and inheritance rights"° hinge on
marital status, and many persons are also aware that social security
payments," family leave benefits, 2 health insurance coverage, 3 hospital
Defense of Marriage Act, I U.S.C.A. § 7 (2004). The effect of this provision is the denial of over
1100 federal rights, privileges, and obligations of marriage to same-sex couples. See infra note 8.
6. The number and variety of laws that hinge on marital status vary significantly by state.
See Chambers, supra note 3, at 447 (discussing in general the rights, benefits, and obligations that
form the overall concept of marriage as a legal institution); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999)
(discussing the importance of marital status for many critical rights afforded to couples under
Vermont law).
7. On the local government level, domestic registries may offer some benefits to public
employees. One scholar explained:
"[D]omestic partnership" ordinances have been adopted in recent years in many
municipalities, counties and other governmental entities. Although "domestic
partnership is not a legal substitute for marriage," the ordinances provide, for
those who have registered as domestic partners, such incentives as group health
insurance, family sick leave, bereavement leave, and hospital visitation rights.
Nancy G. Maxwell, Opening Civil Marriage to Same-Gender Couples: A Netherlands-United
States Comparison, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 141, 197 (2001).
8. There are approximately 1100 federal rights and privileges that are contingent on
marriage, and an average of 500 state laws that depend on marital status. U.S. General Accounting
Office Report B-275860 (Jan. 31, 1997) (reporting that 1049 federal rights and benefits depend on
marital status); John Cloud, 1,138 Reasons Marriage Is Cool: The Many Legal Benefits Of Being
Married, TIME, Mar. 01, 2004 (noting that 1138 federal rights and benefits are granted to married
persons).
9. Mueller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2000-132 (2000) (upholding the Internal Revenue
Code's treatment of married and single persons differently and rejecting petitioner's claim that the
Code discriminated against any "person who shares assets and income with someone who is not
his legal spouse").
10. See, e.g., In re Estate ofCooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. App. Term. 1993) (holding that
the survivor of a same-sex relationship was not entitled to elect against the will of the decedent
partner).
!1. The social security system provides retirement benefits that are accrued by the worker
through a payroll tax. When an individual dies, his or her benefits may be passed only to a
surviving spouse or dependent child. See Treatment of Married Couples in the SSI Program, Soc.
SEcuRrry ADMin., Issue Paper No. 2003-0 (Dec. 2003).
12. See, e.g., Ross v. Denver Dep't of Health, 883 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that an employer was not required to grant sick leave benefits for an employee to care for her
lesbian partner, since same-sex partners do not quality as "immediate family").
13. See, e.g., Hinman v. Dep't of Pers. Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 516 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that an employee's same-sex partner did not qualify as a "spouse" for purposes of
inclusion in an employer-provided insurance program); butsee Tanner v. Oregon Health Sci. Univ.,
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visitation rights, 4 legal standing for wrongful death and loss of
consortium, 15 and even the right to make posthumous burial decisions 6
will not automatically accrue to individuals in relationships that are not
formalized by a marital bond. However, the laws cited here as examples
are only the proverbial "tip of the iceberg." There are countless other laws
within the complex web of federal, state, and local statutes, regulations,
and ordinances that stand to impact nontraditional families when they least
expect to be treated differently.
This Note explores Medicaid estate recovery as one example of a
federal and state initiative that, while often ignored in public discourse, 
7
has the potential to impact nontraditional families quite significantly."
No. 9201-00369, 1996 WL 585547 (Or. Aug. 8, 1996) (ordering the state to provide life, medical,
and dental insurance benefits to domestic partners of state employees).
14. Gays and lesbians can be denied the right to visit their partners in the hospital or make
important medical decisions, since those rights are reserved for spouses or immediate family
members. See Baker, 170 Vt. 194, 201 (Vt. 1999) (explaining that the denial of civil marriage also
means that gay and lesbian couples are denied, inter alia, hospital visitation rights). However, gays
and lesbians can sometimes use private contracts to achieve a legal outcome more reflective of their
committed status. See King v. Bankerd, 492 A.2d 608, 611 (Md. 1985) (describing the "power of
attorney" as a method by which individuals assign other persons to act as their agent in certain
important decisions). A Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care provides a designated
individual the right to make important health care decisions, such as whether to withhold life
support measures, and also provides hospital visitation rights. See, e.g., In re Rochester Gen. Hosp.,
601 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. 1993).
15. See Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988) (holding that a same-sex partner did not
have a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress or loss of consortium for injury
or death of same-sex partner as a result of defendant's tortuous conduct).
16. See Jennifer E. Horan, Note, "When Sleep At Last Has Come": Controlling The
Disposition Of Dead Bodies For Same-Sex Couples, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 423,424 (1999)
(explaining, "[o]ne area of law where unmarried domestic partners often fall outside statutory
benefits is that of determining the proper disposition of a partner's body upon death").
17. In fact, a search of the All-News database on Lexis-Nexis, using the search phrase ("gay
and lesbian" AND "estate recovery") returned only one article discussing the implications of
Medicaid estate recovery on gays and lesbians. That article appeared in a law journal, rather than
a mass communication medium, and therefore was not even really a part of the mainstream public
discourse. The article returned was Douglas A. Fendrick, Estate Planningfor Gays and Lesbians,
156 NEW JERSEY L.J. 676 (1999).
18. Estate recovery programs have the potential to affect all unmarried persons sharing a
home, even when co-ownership was entered into as a mere investment decision by two or more
individuals who are not involved in any deeper emotional bond. In addition, the programs impact
all nontraditional families, such as same-sex couples and groups of single friends or adult siblings
who own a home together and operate like a family unit. For example, the marital exception would
not protect a survivor of the following nontraditional families: two adult siblings sharing a home,
two or more adult friends sharing a home, unmarried heterosexual couples, and all homosexual
couples. However, while estate recovery programs also threaten all unmarried persons who share
a home, the potential impact on nontraditional families is perhaps most significant. For families
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Through estate recovery programs, states carry out a federal mandate and
recover assets from the estates of individuals who receive Medicaid long-
term care assistance." Since the family home is often the only property
remaining in the estate,2" and since the amount of benefits paid often meets
or exceeds the value of the average senior citizen's home,2 the state is
generally authorized to seize the entire residence. In states that have
adopted an expanded definition of "estate,"22 estate recovery programs are
even authorized to seize jointly owned property to the extent of the
decedent's interest.23 However, in order to protect spouses and dependent
children, the federal mandate requires that states postpone foreclosure if
a spouse or dependent child is still living.24 These protections do not apply
to nontraditional families, regardless of the length of time together or other
indicators of each party's intent to support the other. Indeed, the policy
completely ignores the myriad forms of living arrangements that will
likely increase as divorce, 5 death, and alternative lifestyles26 challenge the
assumption that senior citizens reside in husband and wife pairings.
who lack the opportunity to solidify their relationships through marriage, there is no meaningful
way to avoid the harsh application of this law. See infra Part VI.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (2004); see also infra Part III (discussing the evolution of
mandatory estate recovery programs).
20. See infra text accompanying note 53.
21. See infra text accompanying note 57 (citing an average home value among senior citizens
of $96,442).
22. See infra Part V (discussing the OBRA 1993 expanded definition of "estate").
23. See id.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2)-(2)(A) (2004) (providing, in pertinent part: "Any adjustment or
recovery... may be made only after the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any ... and
only at a time ... when he has no surviving child who is under age 21, or ... is blind or
permanently and totally disabled.. ."). In addition, no lien may be attached to the residence if a
qualified sibling, son, or daughter of the decedent resides in the home. See id § 1396p(b)(2)(B)(i)-
(ii).
25. NBC News (NBC television broadcast, June 20, 1997) (explaining that the divorce rate
among senior citizens has doubled since 1980). But see David Blankenhom & Tom Sylvester,
Sorry, But There's No Legion of "Gray Divorcees," ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 10, 2003, at
C13 (arguing that the divorce rate among seniors has not altered significantly in recent years, but
that journalists have sought out individual cases of divorce and publicized their stories as somehow
reflective of a trend).
26. Alternative lifestyles include groups of single persons residing together as a family unit,
such as the fictional group of women on the popular television show, "The Golden Girls," as well
as alternative intimate relationships. While descriptive statistics on the incidence of homosexuality
among senior citizens are lacking, there is certainly a sizable number of older gay Americans
attempting to influence legislation. See, e.g., Kyle Cheney, Older Gay Couples Callfor Equality,
UNIv. WiRE, Jan. 30, 2004.
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The result of Medicaid estate recovery programs for nontraditional
families is a divestiture of the cruelest sort. For example, if an individual
in a nontraditional family dies following Medicaid-funded long-term care,
the state can immediately foreclose on the decedent's interest in the home.
If the home was titled in the decedent's name, the state can seize the entire
home; if the home was jointly owned, the state can seize the decedent's
share. If the decedent owned the home with another in joint tenancy, the
surviving family members will be left with only half of the value of the
home and will lose the right of survivorship; even more significantly, he
or she may be forced to leave behind the comfort and familiarity of the
family home in a time of profound loss and sorrow. In addition to these
impacts on surviving family members, the decedent is robbed of an
opportunity to pass his half-interest directly to the surviving joint tenant,27
and must suffer to know that upon his last breath his family may be forced
to leave behind the home they shared.
Part II of this Note introduces the Medicaid program and explains how
it became the primary payer source for long-term care in the United States.
Part III provides a brief history of Medicaid estate recovery programs, and
Part IV summarizes the current status of federal Medicaid estate recovery
law. Part V provides a summary of various state models of estate recovery,
and analyzes the impact of these models in the context of nontraditional
families. Part VI introduces homestead exemption laws as a source of
protection that applies regardless of marital or familial status, and also
considers whether nontraditional families should be expected to
proactively protect their homes through other measures. Finding that these
options do not fully resolve the problem, Part VII concludes with a
recommendation that the federal government should amend the Social
Security Act to require that states develop undue hardship criteria that
would protect nontraditional families. This solution is ideal because it
provides the necessary protection without exposing the Medicaid system
to additional fraud or unduly restricting a state's ability to recoup benefits
paid.
27. This is not only contrary to the basic premise ofjoint tenancy under traditional property
law, but also contradicts the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Hodel v. Irving. Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704 (1987) (finding that the right to descent and devise property is a distinct property right that
the state must pay just compensation for in the event of a taking).
(Vol. 1 5
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II. BACKGROUND: THE FINANCING OF LONG-TERM CARE THROUGH
MEDICAID'S "MEDICALLY NEEDY" PROVISION
Medicaid is a federally funded, state implemented medical assistance
program established in 1965 under Title XIX of the Social Security Act.2"
The program was originally designed to meet the health insurance needs
of economically disadvantaged persons, or those persons who come within
the "categorically needy" classification.2 9 At the option of each state, the
Medicaid program can also provide health insurance benefits for the
"medically needy." This classification includes persons who may not meet
income guidelines for other welfare programs, but have been rendered
functionally destitute by excessive medical bills.3 ° In contrast, Medicare
is a government-run health insurance plan for senior citizens.3 Although
public opinion surveys often reflect a widespread belief that Medicare will
pay for long-term care,32 Medicare in fact does not provide coverage for
extended nursing home placement. Instead, senior citizens must turn to
some other payer source when long-term care becomes necessary.33 In
theory, their options would include personal or familial assets, private
28. The Medicaid program was established under Title XIX of the Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 121-22, 79 Stat. 370 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ !396-1396s (2004) and 42 C.F.R. § 430-56 (2004). Under the Medicaid program, the federal
government provides block grants to states for the development of a health insurance program for
the impoverished. See Shawn Patrick Regan, Note, Medicaid Estate Planning: Congress'Ersatz
Solution for Long-Term Health Care, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 1217, 1217-18 (1995).
29. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(C), 1396a(a)(13)(B), 1396d(a)(l)-(5). Medicaid was
primarily developed to provide health coverage for the "categorically needy," a term that refers to
families with dependant children, the aged, blind, and disabled, and other groups that currently
receive financial assistance from means-tested federal programs. Id.; see 42 C.F.R. § 435.100-. 135,
.700-.735 (2004).
30. "Medically needy" individuals do not meet the income requirements for other public
assistance programs, but have healthcare needs that cost far more than they are able to pay. See 42
C.F.R. § 435.300-.350, .800-.852 (2004). For a discussion of this category as defined in one state,
North Dakota, see Gregory C. Larson & Melissa Hauer, Planningfor Nursing Home Care in North
Dakota, 74 N.D. L. REv. 191,201 (1998).
31. See Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 290 (1965) (codified
as amended in 26, 42 & 45 U.S.C.). Medicare provides health insurance to individuals over the age
of 65, or those who meet specified disability guidelines. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c) (2004).
32. See M. Ann Miller, Your Money For Your Life: A Survey andAnalysis ofMedicaidEstate
Recovery Programs, I I T.M. CooLEY L. REv. 581, 587 (1994). Medicare only provides coverage
for rehabilitative long-term care, which is limited to 100 days of skilled nursing care. 42 C.F.R. §
409.6 1 (b) (2004).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(9) (2004); 42 C.F.R. § 411.15(g) (2004).
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long-term care insurance,34 or the Medicaid program's "medically needy"
provision.
Since the vast majority of seniors do not carry private long-term care
insurance,3" and since many elderly persons lack sufficient financial
resources to pay the high costs of long-term care,36 most individuals in fact
turn to Medicaid." Medicaid is also a frequent payer source because most
families do not plan for long-term care expenses. In fact, financial
decisions for long-term care are often made during nursing home pre-
admission screening interviews.38 In this late hour, most families are left
only with the option to "spend-down"39 liquid assets on long-term care and
then enroll in Medicaid. This overall lack of pre-institutionalization
planning has its roots not only in financial realities, but also in societal and
psychological dynamics. Aging is not a favored topic of discourse among
most people; planning is generally begun only when medical needs begin
to foreshadow long-term care placement.4°
34. As used here, the phrase "private" includes policies purchased individually or through
an employer.
35. In 1998, one analyst reported that only 7% of long-term care bills are paid through private
insurance arrangements. Walter M. Cadette, Financing Long-Term Care: Options for Policy,
JEROME LEVY ECON. INST., I (Working Paper No. 283) at http://econwpa.wustl.edu:8089/eps/
mac/papersl0004/0004030.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2004). Furthermore, since the phrase "long-
term care" also includes payments for hospital stays for disability and rehabilitation following an
accident, the percentage is even lower if we limit the inquiry to elderly nursing home residents.
36. The average median income for senior citizens in this nation is $ 18,778. Income of the
Aged Chartbook, 2000, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. (released 2002), at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/
docs/chartbooks/incomeaged/2000/iacOO.html#money (last visited May 6, 2004). This perhaps
explains why only about 38% of all nursing home residents are supported by personal or familial
assets. Retirement Survey Shows Vast Majority of Baby Boomers Have Misperceptions About
Paying for Long-Term Care, Bus. WIRE, June 1, 1999.
37. Statistics vary significantly by state, but on average, over half of all nursing home
residents nationwide receive Medicaid benefits. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Marshall, The Medicaid Death
Tax: Medical Assistance Estate Recovery in Pennsylvania, 73 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 112, 113 (2002)
("2/3rds of Pennsylvania nursing home residents receive [Medicaid] benefits"); Jon M. Zieger, The
State Giveth and the State Taketh Away: In Pursuit of a Practical Approach to Medicaid Estate
Recovery, 5 ELDER L.J. 359, 361-62 (1997) (explaining that Medicaid pays the costs of 60% of all
nursing home bed days nationwide).
38. See, e.g., Experts Urge Families Consider Planning For Long-Term Care,
CHATrANOOGA FREE PRESS, July 13, 1997, at B4 [hereinafter Experts Urge Families] (explaining
a general lack of planning for long-term care).
39. For Medicaid spend-down provisions see 42 U.S.C. § 1396(p). A residence is excluded
from the applicant's assets upon initial application. See id.
40. One author explained:
Too often it is only when a family member becomes disabled that they learn that
these expenses will have to be paid for out-of-pocket. Furthermore, individuals
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The fact that most senior citizens do not plan for long-term care is
certainly a significant and alarming reality. However, when considered
alongside the rapidly increasing number of individuals who will require
long-term care, this trend threatens to bankrupt the Medicaid program. In
recent decades, health factors such as increased longevity4 and improved
medical care have greatly expanded the elderly population.42 At the same
time, the increasing incidence of Alzheimer's has amplified the need for
professional care and supervision for elderly persons.43 In addition,
societal changes such as decentralization of the family unit and increased
employment of women outside the home" have deepened the American
family's dependence on nursing homes to provide care for elderly persons.
whose long-term care needs arise as a result of a sudden onset of a stroke or other
illness do not have adequate time to plan.
Janel C. Frank, How Far Is Too Far? Tracing Assets in Medicaid Estate Recovery, 79 N.D. L. REV.
111, 116 n.47 (2003) (quoting S. Rep. No. 106-229(I), at 153 (2000)).
41. Predictions regarding longevity are quite astonishing:
The nation's fastest growing population subset, the group of 3.9 million people
over eighty-five years old, will more than double by 2030, and then double again
by 2050. It is expected that there will be 18 million persons in the country over
age eighty-five by 2050. Today, about 57,000 Americans are over 100 years old,
and, by the year 2030, it is estimated that there will be more than one million
Americans over 100 years old. An astounding eight percent of today's sixty-five
year olds are expected to reach age 100.
Robert D. Hayes et al., What Attorneys Should Know About Long-Term Care Insurance, 7 ELDER
L.J. 1, 5 (1999).
42. The 2002 Current Population Survey reported 59.6 million noninstitutionalized persons
aged 55 or over in the United States. The Older Population in the United States: March 2002,
CENSUS REPORT (Apr. 2002), at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 2003pubs/p20-546.pdf (last visited
May 6, 2004).
43. One author summarized the statistics on Alzheimer's as follows:
[T]he statistical incidence of Alzheimer's disease- a degenerative disease whose
primary symptom is the impairment of cognitive function - is sobering .... In
1980, more than two million individuals had Alzheimer's disease. That number
is expected to increase to four million by the turn of the century and to between
eight million and ten million by 2050 unless a cure or preventative measures are
discovered.
Linda S. Whitton, Caring for the Incapacitated: A Case for Nonprofit Surrogate Decision Makers
in the Twenty-First Century, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 879, 882 (1996).
44. For a discussion of the dramatic increase of women in the work force in post-1950's
America, see ARLiE HOCHSCHILD & ANN MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT, 2-10 (1999).
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In fact, recent reports indicate that increasing percentages of the
population will require long-term care in the future.45
As a result of the growing need for long-term care and the continued
reliance on Medicaid as the primary payer source, Medicaid coffers supply
just under half of the total dollars spent on long-term care nationwide.4"
Senior citizen long-term care placement has taken a sizable "chunk"47 out
of the total Medicaid budget4" and many states have been forced to cut
back on expenditures for other underprivileged persons.49 Unfortunately,
this means that less politically influential groups, 50 such as needy children
and handicapped adults, are at risk of being disadvantaged and
marginalized even further.
45. Senate Aging Committee Hearing on Long-Term Care, Cong. (1998) (statement of Sen.
Michael B. Enzi).
46. "Medicaid is the dominant public program supporting long-term care, accounting for
about 44 percent of the $134 billion spent for services in 1999, [according to a General Accounting
Office Report]." Dennis Camire, Health Care For Baby Boomers Will Demand More Provider
Coordination, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 24, 2001.
47. The "chunk" is quite significant:
In 1998 about 10.6 million aged, blind and disabled were receiving Medicaid
assistance, primarily in the form of long-term care services. Although this group
only represented I in 4 of all Medicaid recipients in 1998, the group accounted for
71% of the $142.3 billion spent by Medicaid that year. In restatement most of
Medicaid's budget is spent on long-term care - services for long-term care
covered only a quarter of Medicaid recipients but represented close to three-
quarters of Medicaid budgets.
Thomas Day, About Medicaid Coverage ofLong-Term Care, at http://www.longtermcarelink.net/
aboutmedicaid.html (last visited May 6, 2004).
48. The total Medicaid budget is extremely large. "According to the latest figures from the
federal government's annual report on national health care spending, Medicaid's total budget had
grown to $224.3 billion in 2001." Kim Krisberg, Medicaid Cuts Eyed as States Tangle with
Deficits, NATION'S HEALTH (Mar. 2003), reprinted at http://www.apha.org/joumal/nation/
medicaidcover0303.htm (last visited May 6, 2004).
49. For example, the income ceiling for Medicaid assistance for the poor has continued to
drop, so that families with incomes that are still considered nominal by most standards are
considered "too well off to qualify for Medicaid.
50. The other sub-groups that come within the Medicaid umbrella are nowhere near as
politically influential as senior citizens, who have organized powerful lobbying organizations, such
as the AARP, to advance their interests.
[Vol. 15
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF MANDATORY ESTATE RECOVERY PROGRAMS
While the demographic and societal trends described above have
already stretched the Medicaid budget significantly,5 the baby boomer
generation threatens to completely bankrupt the program. 2 Lawmakers
have realized a critical need to begin replenishing Medicaid coffers now
through sources other than tax revenues. One way to recoup the costs of
Medicaid is to recover any remaining assets from the estates of decedent
Medicaid beneficiaries. In theory, this practice also serves an important
public policy goal of passing more of the cost burden to private rather than
public resources. 3 Financial logic also supports this practice. Although
Medicaid is a means-tested program and most recipients will not have
large estates, beneficiaries will typically own their home until death
because spend-down provisions permit applicants to retain the principal
residence.54 Coincidentally, this single asset is often quite close to the
value of benefits received. With an average nursing home stay of two and
a half years,55 at an average annual cost of $50,000,6 the typical Medicaid
recipient has often accumulated healthcare benefits of approximately
$100,000-$125,000 - a figure that equals or exceeds the value of the
average senior citizen's home, which is approximately $i100,000.5
51. See supra Part I and sources cited therein.
52. Camire, supra note 46 ("Sen. John Breaux, D-La., chairman of the Senate Special
Committee on Aging, said the nation's 'long-term care system is outdated and ill-equipped to
handle the impending wave of 77 million baby boomers"'). In addition, the cost of long-term care
rises by 8% each year, according to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Paul
Palazzo, Can You Afford To Grow Old? - Lack Of Planning For Long-Term Care Could Add
Fiscal Ruin To Poor Health, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 1, 1999, at D 1.
53. In this manner, estate recovery is an important way to deter "Medicaid planning." See
infra note 64 and sources cited therein.
54. See Experts Urge Families, supra note 38.
55. Hayes et al., supra note 41, at 3.
56. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 40, at 116 ("An individual in a nursing home can expect to
pay between $35,000 and $60,000 each year for the cost of care"); Hayes et al., supra note 41, at
3 (citing an average cost of $47,000 per year for nursing home services). The "odds [of nursing
home placement] rise to sixty percent for a person over seventy-five. In addition, people who do
enter a nursing home can expect their stay to average two and one-half years." Id. at 3; see also
Cadette, supra note 35, at I (citing an annual cost of "upwards of $50,000 per year"); Dee DePass,
Baby Boomers Ignoring Long-Term Care Needs, STAR TRIB., June 2, 1999, at 3D ("A year of
nursing home care costs between $40,000 and $80,000, depending on location").
57. A web site targeted to the senior market provided the following statistics on home
ownership among seniors: "Eighty percent of 65-plus Americans owned their homes, an ownership
percentage far above the national average. Seventy-six percent of older homeowners own their
homes free and clear. Average home value is $96,442. (Home ownership for other age groups is:
15 to 24, 17.9%; 25-34,45.6%; 35-44,66.2%; 55-64, 79.8%.)." Suddenly Senior (citing American
Housing Survey for the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2000); Housing Characteristics:
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Yet despite the attractiveness of estate recovery from a purely
economic or mathematical perspective, and although states have had
discretionary authority to enact estate recovery programs since 1982,58
early efforts were largely ineffective and estate recovery was not
systematically pursued.59 In fact, during the period from 1982 until 1993,
when estate recovery was still optional, only 28 states established
programs to recoup costs from the estates of decedent beneficiaries.60
Many states resisted the enactment of estate recovery programs because
the potential political ramifications for state officials seemed to outweigh
financial benefits to the state. In the eyes of state legislatures, estate
recovery was a dangerous public relations move which robbed senior
citizens of the opportunity to pass property to loved ones.6 Yet in the eyes
of the federal government, estate recovery was critical to the Medicaid
program's ability to continue providing for groups beyond the elderly.62
2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2001)), at http://www.suddenlysenior.com/maturemarketstats2002.
html (last visited May 6, 2004).
58. Since the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 132(b),
96 Stat. 324,370-73 (1982) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. 1396p(a) (2004)), the federal government has
enabled states to recover the cost of Medicaid benefits from the estates of beneficiaries. However,
there is evidence that some states pursued estate recovery even before the 1982 legislation:
[I]n 1975, the Oregon Legislature authorized the recovery of the cost of medical
assistance from beneficiaries sixty-five years and older. Also, Michigan's
Department of Social Services had attempted to establish a recovery program. But
the Department abandoned the effort in 1956, after a state attorney general opinion
stated that absent statutory authority, no recovery was permitted.
Miller, supra note 32, at 592.
59. Regan, supra note 28, at 1247-48 (explaining that under the pre-OBRA 1993 optional
estate recovery scheme, "only one-half of all states maintained ... estate recovery programs and,
among those that did, very few were effective"); Miller, supra note 32 (asserting that among those
states that had enacted estate recovery programs, the methods and relative success of these efforts
varied significantly. "In Rhode Island, the state reported a gross recovery of approximately $4.24
per nursing home resident. In Oregon, the gross recovery was only $327.44").
60. Frank, supra note 40, at 117.
61. For example, when Texas developed its state program according to the federal mandate,
public outcry was significant. Peggy Fikac, Estate Seizure Worries Texans; Law Oks Taking Homes
of Some Patients to Recoup Medicaid Costs, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 15, 2003, at 1A
(citing correspondence from citizens to state officials: "Reminds me of Hitler getting the gold
fillings out of the inmates' teeth in the concentration camps before they went to the ovens,"...
"You've Got Some Nerve" came from another man who said his elderly parents were "horrified
and scared that all they've worked for and all that they hoped to pass on to their kids and grandchild
will be gone").
62. One court summarized the federal government's position as follows: "allowing states to
recover from the estates of persons who previously received assistance furthers the broad purpose
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This fundamental difference in vantage point would ultimately be
resolved through a national mandate. Federal lawmakers determined that
optional estate recovery programs were insufficient; forced state
participation would be the only way to prevent budgetary collapse. Beyond
pecuniary concerns, federal law makers also hoped that mandatory estate
recovery would discourage abuse of the program by middle class persons
who qualify for Medicaid by transferring or shielding assets prior to the
three-year lookback period63 used during initial application." Estate
recovery would enable states to retrieve assets that had somehow escaped
discovery during initial application, thereby preserving the program's
spirit as a means-tested social safety net for the truly economically
disadvantaged.
of providing for the medical care of the needy; the greater amount recovered by the state allows the
state to have more funds to provide future services." Belshe v. Hope, 33 Cal. App. 4th 161, 173
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
63. When an individual applies for Medicaid benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(l)(A), (B)
directs state officials to determine whether assets have been transferred or divested by the applicant
within a certain "lookback period." The lookback period is 36 months for most transfers, but an
extended 60 month period applies to all transfers into an inter vivos trust. Id. § 1396p(c)(I)(B). Any
transfers of assets for less than fair market value within the lookback period will result in a penalty
calculation, meaning that the applicant is ineligible for Medicaid benefits until he or she privately
pays for long-term care services in an amount equal to the value of the assets transferred. Id. §
1396p(c)(E). Assets held in co-ownership arrangements will be considered transferred when any
action is taken that reduces or eliminates the applicant's (or his or her spouse's) ownership or
control of the asset. Id. § 1396p(c)(3).
64. In public discourse, asset shielding for Medicaid eligibility is often framed as the "smart"
or "necessary" way to approach long-term care planning. See, e.g., Jenny Callison, When Family
Needs Family, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 10, 2003, at ID ("Lack of planning to shield even
modest assets can disqualify a person from needed Medicaid benefits down the road"). However,
there is an active and ongoing debate concerning Medicaid "estate planning" among academics,
practicing attorneys, and lawmakers. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Crosby & Ira M. Leff, Ethical
Considerations in Medicaid Estate Planning: An Analysis of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1503 (1994) (presenting case studies to depict the murkier areas of
estate planning, such as the case of a client who wishes to lie on the Medicaid application in order
to receive benefits); Regan, supra note 28 (detailing federal amendments in the early 1990s that
closed many estate-planning loopholes, and concluding that although these steps are significant,
the problem will continue until Congress develops viable long-term care financing options rooted
in the private sector); John M. Broderick, Note, To Transfer or Not to Transfer: Congress Failed
to Stiffen Penalties for Medicaid Estate Planning, but Should the Practice Continue? 6 ELDER L.J.
257, 291-92 (1998) (arguing that additional legislation is needed to prevent Medicaid estate
planning, since the practice can "becom[e] a threat to the elder's autonomy and independence" and
result in a conflict of interest for the attorney).
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These federal interests were codified in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993),65 which conditioned state
eligibility for federal Medicaid matching funds on the enactment of
programs to recoup certain Medicaid costs. 66 Specifically, OBRA 1993
amended the Social Security Act to mandate recovery of the value of long-
term care benefits from the estate of decedents who received Medicaid
benefits beyond the age of 55.67 As amended, the Social Security Act
plainly requires that each state develop an estate recovery program.68
Despite the clear federal mandate, in the years immediately following
the new legislation, many states continued to drag their feet and estate
recovery seldom occurred.69 Even among early adopter states, recovery
took place in very limited circumstances, and the income generated by
these programs remained nominal.70 Additionally, many state lawmakers
continued to express concerns that estate recovery would create a public
relations problem; some states forestalled implementation of estate
recovery programs as long as they could."
Today, while many state programs are still in their infancy, the trend
is clearly toward more systematic recovery,72 and estate recovery programs
65. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, tit. XIII, § 13562, 107
Stat. 312, 596-605 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p) (2004).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b).
67. Id. § 1396p(b)(1)(B).
68. Id. § 1396a (establishing the Medicaid portion of the Social Security Act which
conditions state receipt of funding on "compl[iance] with the provisions of section 1917 [42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p] with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of medical assistance correctly
paid ... transfers of assets, and treatment of certain trusts."). Id. § 1396a(a)(18). In provisions
specifically dealing with Medicaid estate recovery, the Act provides, in pertinent part, "In the case
of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such medical
assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate." Id. at §
1396p(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
69. One survey found that in 1997, four states - Alaska, Georgia, Texas and Michigan -
still had not developed estate recovery programs. Susan Harmuth & Beth Kidder, State Medicaid
Estate Recovery Programs, N.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuM. SERVICES (1998), at
http://www.longtermcarelink.net/reference/refmedicaidrecovery.html (last visited May 6, 2004).
70. See, e.g., Steven Saunders & John M. Hall, So What Gives With Medicaid Estate
Recovery?, 21 VT. B. J. & L. DiG. 31 (1995) (writing in 1995 about the state of Vermont's "on-
again/off-again approach to estate recovery in previous years").
71. See June Gibbs Brown, Medicaid Estate Recovery Programs, 6 REPORT OEI-07-92-
00880 (1995). West Virginia vehemently resisted the federal mandate, and even filed suit against
the federal government, alleging that forced estate recovery was a violation of the Tenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See West Virginia v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 289
F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2002). The suit was unsuccessful, and the state subsequently yielded to federal
law and established an estate recovery program. See id.
72. One author provides a concise summary of data showing this trend:
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are likely to expand further as nursing home placement becomes even
more widespread and costs continue to rise.
IV. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING ESTATE RECOVERY
PROGRAMS TODAY
Beyond its formation of mandatory estate recovery, OBRA 1993 also
introduced several other significant changes. Most notably, the legislation
encouraged states to conduct estate recovery against a much broader range
of assets by adopting an expanded definition of "estate." This and other
significant changes are noted in the following summary of estate recovery
as it is delineated in the federal legislation.
A. Spousal and Dependent Child Protections
Even under OBRA 1993's mandatory estate recovery programs, a
state's ability to collect against the estate of a Medicaid recipient is not
absolute. Estate beneficiaries are not only potentially insulated from
recovery claims that relate to Medicaid benefits provided before passage
of OBRA 1993, 7 but additional limitations protect decedents' still-living
family members. The federal statute only permits the state to recover from
the estate after the death of the surviving spouse or dependent child of a
Medicaid recipient. 74 Generally, this is interpreted to mean that the
surviving spouse or dependent children have the legal equivalent of a life
estate in the property, since the state retains the right to retrieve the
decedent's assets from their estates upon death.
For instance, in Missouri, a state with a comprehensive estate recovery program,
$1,316,925 was recovered during fiscal year 1993, and $8,832,006 between 1981
and 1993. The former figure represents less than one percent of all Medicaid
expenditures in that state during the same year. In Illinois, recovery has been
somewhat more effective, generating approximately $10,669,740 in recoveries in
fiscal year 1995 and placing liens upon property valued at $1,371,991. Moreover,
the first two months of 1996 represent asubstantial increase over 1995 recoveries,
with $10,014,599 recovered through the end of February 1996.
Zieger, supra note 37, at 374-75.
73. Courts disagree on whether OBRA 1993 should be applied retroactively. An Arkansas
state court found that the law could not be applied retroactively in Estate of Wood v. Arkansas
Dep't of Hum. Servs., 894 S.W.2d 573 (Ark. 1995). But see In re Estate ofThompson, 586 N.W.2d
847 (1998) (reaching the opposite result and recovering for benefits paid prior to OBRA's passage).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(I)(B).
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B. The Expanded Definition of "Estate" in OBRA 1993
OBRA 1993 not only made estate recovery mandatory; the amended
law also strengthened existing estate recovery programs by significantly
expanding the state's ability to seize assets. As a baseline, the statute
defines the term "estate" to include all assets within the individual's estate
under state probate law.75 Additionally, at the option of each state,76
recovery programs can define "estate" to also include "any other real and
personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest),
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement."" This
75. At a minimum, the "estate," for estate recovery purposes, includes "all real and personal
property and other assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state
probate law." Id. § 1396p(b)(4)(A).
76. More and more states have adopted this expanded definition in recent years. See, e.g.,
Frederick Melo, Cape Cod, Mass., Officials Criticize New Medicaid Laws, CAPE COD TIMES, Aug.
21, 2003 (explaining Massachusetts' 2003 adoption of the expanded definition of"estate" for estate
recovery purposes).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The significance of the new definition is captured below:
The probate estate [which was often the basis for pre-OBRA 1993 estate recovery
efforts] does not include certain property that is said to pass outside of the estate.
Property interests that pass outside of the probate estate include joint property
interests, life estate interests, property that passes by way of survivorship, payable-
on-death provisions, life insurance, and beneficial interests in trusts. Under
OBRA, states may define "estate" as the probate estate, or may expand the
definition to include property that the decedent had an interest in and that passed
to others outside of the probate estate. Thus, states now have the option of
implementing a broad-based estate recovery, depending upon how they choose to
define the "estate."
Frank, supra note 40, at 118. Practically speaking, the decedent's estate is likely to be comprised
solely of a home since this is one of the few assets Medicaid permits recipients to retain. See 42
U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(1). Before OBRA 1993 expanded the definition of "estate," the Medicaid estate
recovery provisions of the Social Security Act did not define "estate." Therefore, states typically
defined the term based on its common law meaning in that jurisdiction. See Citizens Action League
v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003, 1006-08 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that "estate" should be defined based on
its common law meaning, which did not includejoint tenancies); Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923,
925-27 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that since OBRA 1993 should not be applied retroactively, for cases
in which the recipient received benefits prior to 1993, the common law definition of"estate" should
govern recovery determinations. The common law definition did not include property held in an
inter vivos trust, but did include community property and property held in tenancy in common).
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expanded definition of "estate" further advances the governmental
interests of recouping costs in order to continue providing for the truly
needy,7" since it enables states to reach property that could traditionally be
sheltered by various loopholes.79 The provision was a response to the many
asset transferring or sheltering mechanisms that have been promulgated
since Medicaid's inception.0
C. The Use of TEFRA Liens
In an effort to make estate recovery even more efficient, states are also
authorized to attach liens to property belonging to Medicaid long-term care
recipients while they are still alive.8 ' However, liens may only be attached
in certain specific circumstances.8 2 Most significantly, the state may not
attach a lien if a spouse or dependent child is still living. 3 In all other
situations, the state must first make a showing that the Medicaid
beneficiary is not reasonably expected to be discharged from the long-term
care facility. 4 However, even under these circumstances, additional
78. See supra Part II.
79. For a thorough discussion of one of the boldest loopholes, fraudulent divorce, see
Michael Farley, Note, When "I Do" Becomes "I Don't": Eliminating the Divorce Loophole to
Medicaid Eligibility, 9 ELDER L.J. 27 (2001).
80. The evolution of mandatory and more effective estate recovery programs has significantly
restricted Medicaid estate planning. OBRA 1993 increased the penalties that could accrue as a
result of unqualified asset transfers, reduced the ability to qualify for Medicaid despite receiving
trust income, and further empowered states to seize assets that are discovered in the Medicaid
recipient's estate after death. Kristin A. Reich, Long-Term Care Financing Crisis: Recent Federal
and State Efforts to Deter Asset Transfers as a Means to Gain Medicaid Eligibility, 74 N.D.L. REV.
383, 391 n.62 (1998).
81. One author explained the key difference between estate recovery and TEFRA liens:
They are both governed by different restrictions and have different ramifications
for the recipient. The lien is merely a security interest in a future recovery placed
on the recipient's property while that person is still alive, whereas the estate
recovery claim is "a bill presented to the heirs," requiring present payment.
Zieger, supra note 37, at 370-71.
82. Liens may also be attached if the state determines, following a proceeding, that the state
has paid Medicaid benefits that the recipient was not authorized to receive. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(a)(l).
83. It is irrelevant whether the spouse or dependent child is residing in the home. See id. §
1396p(b)(2).
84. The state must conduct this in a manner that comports with due process requirements:
[A] medical determination must be made that the recipient cannot reasonably be
expected to return home. This requires that the recipient receive notice of the
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familial protections further limit the state's ability to attach liens to
property. If the Medicaid beneficiary's sibling or adult child resides in
home, and has lived there for a certain length of time before the Medicaid
beneficiary was admitted to the long-term care facility, the state cannot
place a lien on the property. 5
Once a lien has been attached, the state will foreclose against it if the
Medicaid beneficiary attempts to alienate the property, such as through
sale or gift.86 Otherwise, the state will foreclose at the time of the Medicaid
beneficiary's death.87 If, however, the recipient is discharged from the
long-term care facility, the lien will be automatically removed from the
property.88
D. The Provision of Hardship Waivers
Beyond spousal and dependent-child exceptions, estate recovery
programs may also protect surviving family members under certain other
circumstances. States must provide for "undue hardship" waivers.8
However, while the federal government requires that states provide
waivers,9" it did not define "undue hardship" in OBRA 1993. Instead, the
federal enactment vaguely instructs states to "establish procedures in
determination and that a hearing comporting with traditional notions of
substantive due process be made available to the recipient. Furthermore, the notice
must explain what is meant by the term lien and indicate that imposing a lien does
not mean that the individual will lose ownership of the home. The hearing is
conducted according to state procedures established as part of the state Medicaid
plan pursuant to federal regulation. The burden of proof rests with the state to
show that the recipient will not likely be discharged from the institution.
Zieger, supra note 37, at 372. This provision is found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(l)(B)(i).
85. These protections are found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). The Medicaid
beneficiary's sibling must have resided in the home for at least one year prior to admission to a
long-term care facility. In the case of the adult child, however, further conditions must be met. The
child must have lived in the Medicaid beneficiary's residence and he or she must have provided
care to his or her parent for at least two years prior to admission to a long-term care facility. The
care provided must have forestalled admission to a skilled facility. In this manner, the law
essentially rewards families who are able to provide care in a more cost-effective manner.
86. Id. § 1396p(b)(l).
87. See id. § 1396p(a)(i).
88. See id. § 1396p(a)(3).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(3).
90. See Johnson v. Guhl, 91 F. Supp. 2d 754,769 (2000) (finding that "[t]he use of the word
'shall' in § 1396p(c)(2)(D) makes the 'undue hardship' exception mandatory rather than precatory.
"The language succinctly sets forth a congressional command, which is wholly uncharacteristic of
a mere suggestion or 'nudge,").
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accordance with standards specified by the Secretary [of each state's
agency that oversees Medicaid programs] under which the agency shall
waive [estate recovery] . . . if such [recovery] would work an undue
hardship on the basis of criteria established by the Secretary."'" As a result
of this rather hazy directive, hardship criteria vary significantly by state.
In most states, hardship waivers are based on "unduly restrictive"
criteria, so that very limited protections actually exist.92 In some highly
restrictive states, hardship waivers are only granted where the home is of
very modest value, or where the home is the principle source of income for
heirs.93 In these states, a surviving nontraditional family member would
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(3). In addition, there are some procedural regulations imposed upon
states by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA):
According to section 3259.8(C) of the [HCFA] guidelines, the state has
"considerable flexibility in deciding the circumstances under which [the state] will
not count funds in trusts under the trust provisions because of undue hardship."
Under the undue hardship provision, however, the state must, at a minimum,
provide for "notice to recipients that an undue hardship exception exists; [a]
timely process for determining whether an undue hardship waiver will be granted;
[a] process under which an adverse determination can be appealed." Section
3259.8(c).
Johnson, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 769.
92. The phrase was used to explain Vermont's approach to the "undue hardship"
determination. Saunders & Hall, supra note 70, at 31. That state permits officials to forego estate
recovery in the following instances:
(1) when the deceased Medicaid recipient's sibling lived in the recipient's home
for at least one year prior to the decedent's date of admission to long-term care,
the Department will not seek recovery from the estate if doing so would dispossess
the sibling of his/her interest in the home... (2)... when a son or daughter lived
in the Medicaid recipient's home for at least 2 years prior to the date of the
recipient's admission to long-term care, and also provided care to the recipient
which permitted him/her to remain at home and avoid admission to a long-term
care [facility] for a longer period than would otherwise have been
possible ... (3) ... if the only funds that can be recovered from the Medicaid
recipient's estate are assets which serve as the sole source of income for the
decedent's immediate family, such as a family farm or business .... (4) ... if
liquidation of income-producing assets to satisfy the Department's claim would
result in the decedent's immediate family needing to apply for public assistance.
Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
93. The Federal Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) published a state manual
which recommends that states give hardship consideration when: "the estate subject to recovery is
(1) the sole income-producing asset of the survivors, (2) a homestead of modest value, or (3) other
compelling circumstances exist." In re Estate of Cox, 180 Misc. 2d 83, 85 (1999). The latter
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not be able to claim a hardship that comes within the state's guidelines.
Even among those states that have adopted more comprehensive standards
for determining hardship,94 the lists of factors rarely contain provisions
that would protect nontraditional family members in the same manner that
spouses are protected.95 Additionally, courts and legislatures have been
provision seems to suggest that the federal government envisaged a much broader hardship waiver,
but states have typically adopted much more narrow standards.
94. See, e.g., California has one of the most comprehensive sets of standards for determining
whether a hardship waiver should be granted. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50963(a)(l)-(6)
(2004) (providing six factors that may be taken into account by California officials in determining
whether an "undue hardship" exists). The list includes:
(1) When, without receipt of the proceeds of the estate, the applicant would
become eligible for public assistance payments and/or medical assistance
programs; or, (2) When allowing the applicant to receive the inheritance from the
estate would enable the applicant to discontinue eligibility for public assistance
payments and/or medical assistance programs; or, (3) When the estate property is
part of a business, including a working farm or ranch, and recovery of medical
assistance expenditures would result in the applicants losing their sole means of
livelihood; or, (4) When any aged, blind or disabled individuals who have been
continuously living in the decedent's home for one year or more, and continue to
reside there, would have difficulty obtaining financing (such as a home equity
loan) to repay the State; or, (5) When the applicant transferred the property to the
decedent for no consideration; or, (6) When equity in the real property is needed
by the applicant to make the property habitable, or to acquire the necessities of
life, such as, food, clothing, shelter or medical care.
Id.
95. Some states have adopted very vague language. Since large bodies of case law have yet
to develop, there is little interpretive material available and citizens cannot reasonably predict
whether their particular situation would come within the state's definition of an "undue hardship."
The decision, therefore, will typically rest with bureaucrats who also may lack interpretive
guidelines. The Arkansas undue hardship test's final prong, even when read against the complete
section, is an exceptionally vague standard:
(A) The estate asset subject to recovery is the sole income-producing asset of the
beneficiaries of the estate; (B) Without receipt of the proceeds of the estate, a
beneficiary would become eligible for federal or state benefits; (C) Allowing a
beneficiary to receive the inheritance from the estate would enable a beneficiary
to discontinue eligibility for federal or state benefits; (D) The estate asset subject
to recovery is a home with a value of fifty percent (50%) or less of the average
price of homes in the county where the homestead is located, as of the date of the
beneficiary's death; or (E) There are other compelling circumstances.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-76-436 (Michie 2003) (emphasis added).
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very reluctant to establish guidelines for handling cases that suggest a
different form of hardship not envisaged by lawmakers.96
However, one rare exception, the Pennsylvania estate recovery
program, does provide a set of undue hardship factors that could
conceivably protect a surviving nontraditional family member if the
surviving member has lived with and cared for the decedent. In many
cases, nontraditional families will come within the language of the statute
because the parties have cohabited for the requisite period of time and the
surviving member was a source of pre-institutionalization care.97
V. THE IMPACT OF STATE MODELS OF IMPLEMENTATION ON
NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES
As the preceding sections explain, mandatory estate recovery advances
the important governmental puiposes of maintaining the ability to provide
for the poor and discouraging middle class reliance on Medicaid.
However, these goals have been expressly limited since they must yield to
the governmental interest of preventing spousal impoverishment or
96. See, e.g., In re Estate of Frink, No. 21744-2-111, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 3103 (Wa. Dec.
30, 2003) (interpreting the hardship waiver provisions strictly, and finding that an applicant for a
hardship waiver in Washington state did not meet the statutory requirements. While the applicant
was impoverished due to already present financial and employment problems, these difficulties
were not caused or worsened by the state's recovery efforts. The waiver would only be provided
if the actual estate recovery efforts were the cause of all or a significant portion of the applicant's
impoverishment).
97. The Pennsylvania regulations regarding hardship waivers would seem to protect a
surviving nontraditional family member in at least some circumstances:
(b) The Department will find undue hardship and will permanently waive its claim
with respect to the primary residence of a decedent if the person requesting the
undue hardship waiver mets all of the following conditions:
(1) The person has continuously resided in the primary residence of the decedent
for at least 2 years immediately preceding the decedent's receipt of nursing facility
services, or, for at least 2 years during the period of time which Medicaid-funded
home and community based services were received.
(2) The person has no other alternative permanent residence.
(3) The person has provided care or support to the decedent for at least 2 years
during the period of time that Medicaid-funded home and community based
services were received by the decedent, or for at least 2 years prior to the
decedent's receipt of nursing home services during which time the decedent
needed care or support to remain at home.
55 PA. CODE § 258.10 (2004). Clearly, a surviving nontraditional family member could demonstrate
that he or she meets all three criteria.
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hardship to dependents. The legislation specifically provides that recovery
cannot take place so long as a spouse or dependent child is alive.9" This,
too, reflects a commendable legislative purpose. There is tremendous
sorrow upon the passing of one's spouse; consequently, for moral and
public accountability reasons it would be unacceptable for the state to step
in and force a sale of the marital home.99 Similarly, from an economic
efficiency standpoint, the state has an interest in keeping citizens off
public assistance. A policy that seizes the principle assets of recently
widowed senior citizens would clearly be irrational since it would likely
drive many individuals into a state of poverty. However, these potential
injustices and absurd economic outcomes do not only threaten the marital
bond or traditional family unit. The spousal and dependent child
exceptions only protect limited classes and therefore fail to consider the
impoverishment and hardship potentially faced by surviving members of
nontraditional families.
As the previous section revealed, the federal mandate leaves many
details of estate recovery within the discretion of the states. It should
therefore not be surprising that estate recovery programs vary considerably
by state.100 Programs differ in the type of property recovered, as well as in
the manner in which it is acquired. Since this Note focuses on the impact
of estate recovery efforts on nontraditional families, the following analysis
divides state programs based on their potential to impact these families by
divesting the family home.
A. State Programs that Retain a more Restrictive Definition of "Estate"
As noted above, OBRA 1993 declares that states may expand the
definition of estate to include
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust
or other arrangement.'
98. See supra Part IV and accompanying notes.
99. Indeed, state lawmakers were concerned about the negative public perception that this
can create. See Brown, supra note 71.
100. Id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
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Despite this authorization, the majority of states continue to use the
traditional definition of "estate" for recovery purposes.' °2 In these states,
estate recovery efforts are confined to probate property, which includes all
property that passes by will or intestacy. 3 Therefore, joint tenancy
property, life insurance proceeds, and interests in trusts remain beyond the
reach of estate recovery. As a result, the risks to surviving nontraditional
family members are less significant.
Nontraditional families that own property in joint tenancy, or have
placed the property in a trust arrangement, 1' would not be at risk for
divestiture of the family home following the death of a family member
who received Medicaid benefits for long-term care since the home would
pass outside of the probate estate. However, nontraditional families are at
risk if legal and equitable title to the home is held in the Medicaid
beneficiary's name only. In that case, the entire home would pass through
the probate estate, and the state could recover the asset regardless of the
decedent's intended disposition as reflected in his will.' This harsh result
could, however, be avoided if title is transferred at some earlier point.1
0 6
102. For a state-by-state breakdown, see Harmuth & Kidder, supra note 69.
103. For example, North Dakota uses the following definition for estate recovery purposes:
"property, whether movable or immovable, wherever situated, that would pass by intestate
succession if the decedent died without a valid will." Frank, supra note 40, at 130 (quoting N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(1)(a)(7) (1999)).
104. However, in order to qualify for Medicaid benefits at the time of initial application, the
trust arrangement would have to be established prior to the applicable lookback period. Otherwise,
it will be deemed a gift, and the applicant will be assigned a penalty equal to the value of the
transfer.
105. In contrast, if a home was titled in the name of only one legal spouse, then the spousal
protection would still apply and the home could not be recovered until the surviving spouse's death.
106. However, any changes in home ownership must be accomplished long before nursing
home needs become apparent, since title transfers for little or no consideration will be treated as
gifts. This is particularly important for gay and lesbian couples, since property is often titled in one
person's name, particularly if the two met later in life. For example, if Partner A has title to the
home, but Partner B has been helping to pay the mortgage and other expenses for twenty years, the
two may assume that there will be a way to ensure that Partner B retains the home if something
should happen to Partner A. This is particularly true if the couple is unaware of Medicaid estate
recovery laws. Once the couple does become aware of the laws, if Partner A decides to alter the
ownership arrangement of the home, by either placing the entire home in Partner B's name or
placing it in joint tenancy with B, he must do so before the three-year lookback period begins.
Otherwise, he will not be eligible for Medicaid benefits for a period of nursing home care that
equals the value of the transfer. Of course, the same strategy can also backfire. For example,
assume the same couple wished to be proactive and Partner A placed the home in joint tenancy long
before his own long-term care needs became apparent. If Partner B suddenly requires long-term
care, the state will be authorized to recover against half of the home to recoup Medicaid benefits
paid to B. This would be true even if Partner B were a new partner, who just moved into the home
and never paid any amount of the mortgage. The law would consider the joint tenancy to be a gift
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B. State Programs that have Adopted an Expanded
Definition of "Estate"
Following OBRA 1993, at least fifteen states have adopted an
expanded definition of "estate."' 7 A state has adopted an expanded
definition if it pursues recovery from property that is not traditionally
included within the probate estate. For example, although Maryland and
Rhode Island technically use an expanded definition of "estate," this does
not mean that either state recovers against all forms of property listed in
OBRA 1993. Instead, these two states only recover against the probate
estate, liquid assets that may have escaped probate, and limited types of
personal property." 8 In states that have only expanded "estate" to include
these other assets, nontraditional families could still protect the home
through a joint tenancy arrangement.
In contrast, other states have adopted a significantly more
comprehensive definition of "estate." For example, Idaho,"
9 Iowa, 10
Massachusetts," ' Minnesota, "2 and New Jersey' 13 have explicitly adopted
the recommended OBRA 1993 definition by including language that is
remarkably similar to that legislation's definition of "estate."' 4 In these
made by A to B, and upon transfer B would be recognized as the legal owner of one-half of the
home. At this point, the couple would also be precluded from reversing the joint tenancy and
placing the property back into Partner A's name, since 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(3) declares that co-
owned property will be considered transferred ifeither person reduces or eradicates his or her share.
As these examples demonstrate, there is no easy answer for gay and lesbian couples that wish to
retain the home for the surviving partner.
107. The following states currently use an expanded definition of "estate": California,
Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Harmuth & Kidder, supra
note 69.
108. See id.
109. See infra note 116 (providing a citation to, and full text of, the relevant Idaho code
provision).
110. See IOWA ADMIN. CODEr. 249A.5 (2003).
111. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118E, § 31 (2004).
112. See MINN. R. 256B.15 (2003).
113. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-7.2 (West 2004).
114. IDAHO CODE § 56-218 (Michie 2003).
[The estate includes any other real and personal property and other assets in
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
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states, property held in joint tenancy would be subject to estate recovery,
to the extent of the decedent's interest.' As this qualifier indicates, the
state may only recover the decedent's share of the property.
The broadening of estate recovery to reach jointly held property
significantly threatens countless families. In many families, property is
held in joint tenancy with rights of survivorship as a means of ensuring
survivors' rights to the home in the event of one owner's death."' Joint
tenancies are premised on the common law theory that the decedent's
interest in the property dissolves upon his death.' Families therefore enter
joint tenancy arrangements with an expectation that the home will pass to
survivors by operation of law. Given the overall lack of awareness about
Medicaid policies in the general population, it is highly improbable that
nontraditional families are aware that in some states, estate recovery
programs can eradicate these protections. Therefore, when states adopt a
fully expanded definition of "estate," they completely erode the traditional
protections of a joint tenancy, as well as the expectations and hopes of
parties who place homes in this form of concurrent ownership."'
Even though estate recovery against jointly held property only reaches
the decedent's half interest, the recovery nonetheless poses considerable
Id.
115. See supra text accompanying note 114. In the text of the Idaho statute provided, the
parenthetical clearly establishes this proposition. Other states have adopted the notion of the
expanded estate, but have not chosen to use OBRA 1993's recommended language. See, e.g., IND.
CODE ANN. § 12-15-9-0.5 (West 2004).
116. A brief description ofjoint tenancy property demonstrates the party's likely expectations:
The main benefit of a joint estate can be found in the doctrine of survivorship,
which maintains that "when two or more persons are seized of a joint estate, ...
the entire tenancy upon the decease of any of them remains to the survivors, and
at length to the last survivor; and he shall be entitled to the whole estate, whatever
it may be." While either party can sever a joint tenancy, neither party has the
ability to bequeath property held by both parties in joint tenancy. This aspect also
incorporates a probate avoidance feature, in that ownership of the property will
pass to the surviving joint tenant as an operation of law without becoming part of
the estate of the decedent.
Major Joseph E. Cole, Introduction to Estate and Tax Planning Fundamentals, 47 A.F. L. REv.
189, 201 (1999).
117. These basic notions ofjoint tenancy with right of survivorship are delineated in 20 Am.
JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 21 (2003).
118. In this sense, the law essentially rewrites traditional property law. Frank, supra note 40,
at 131-32 (discussing In re Estate of Jobe, 590 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), which held that
the traditional rule ofjoint tenancy with right of.survivorship did not invalidate the state's ability
to recover against property jointly owned).
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hardship on surviving nontraditional family members who consider the
intact residence to be their home. First, the satisfaction of the state's
demand will often require a sale of the property, since many seniors lack
the means to effectuate a "buy out" by reimbursing the state from saved or
borrowed funds. A forced sale, conducted on the state's terms, is not
necessarily in the best interests of survivors; the real estate market may be
at a lull or survivors may not have time to adequately prepare the residence
for the market. In certain areas of the country, rising home values and tight
real estate markets may render it impossible for survivors to purchase a
new home with their remaining half-interest." 9 These financial realities
could result in a forced relocation - away from place of employment,
family, and friends. While the above examples assume that the home is
previously unencumbered, the existence of a mortgage can further
complicate matters?2 Survivors, who in many cases will also be senior
citizens, may no longer have employment income. In that case, they would
most likely be unable to secure financing for a subsequent home.
Even more, the use of liens in some states to secure the state's interest
in property introduces additional concerns when the state recovers against
jointly owned property. The New Jersey administrative code authorizes
that state's program to attach liens encompassing the entire value ofjointly
owned property.' Although eventual recovery is capped in proportion to
119. For example, in some of the nation's most concentrated gay and lesbian communities
(such as Key West, Florida, and San Francisco, California), home prices are already high and
continue to rise at astounding rates. See Housing Costs Rising Faster Than Income, SuN-SENTINEL,
May 26, 2002, at IA ("Monroe County, home of Key West, has the most expensive housing in
Florida. Workers can't find affordable places to live on the island. Monroe tops the state in average
housing costs."); Coldwell Banker Annual Study Finds $1.1 Million Variance for Same Property
in Nation's Most Expensive and Most Affordable Markets, Bus. WIRE, July 31, 2001 (discussing
the results of a study comparing property values in over 300 American cities and metropolitan
areas).
120. For example, the surviving partner may no longer be working, so that if he or she must
pay off part of the mortgage with his or her half interest and then enter the real estate market to
purchase a new home, he or she may no longer be able to obtain another mortgage.
121. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 49-14.1(m) (2004). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Any lien filed on or after October 4, 1999 against an estate as described in (1)2
above shall describe the extent of the deceased Medicaid beneficiary's interest
covered by the lien, if known to the Division at the time the lien is filed. For
example, if a deceased Medicaid beneficiary at the time of his death owned real
property as a tenant-in-common with another individual, the lien should state that
it encumbers only 50 percent of the equity in the real property. If the deceased
Medicaid beneficiary held a tenancy-by-the-entirety orjoint tenancy with a right
ofsurvivorship, then the lien shall state that it encumbers all of the property.
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the decedent's interest in the property, even a temporary encumbrance of
the entire residence could be significantly burdensome to survivors. A lien
clouds title, thereby impacting the owner's credit rating, and can
potentially violate mortgage lender agreements, prevent owners from
borrowing against the home, and limit the ability to freely alienate the
property. 2 ' This is not to mention the discomfort that many individuals
feel at the thought of potential liabilities.
Congress likely intended to prevent these emotional and financial
strains when it drafted spousal and familial exceptions. Unfortunately,
concern was not extended beyond the traditional family unit; as a result,
nontraditional families residing in states that have adopted the expanded
definition of "estate" are at particular risk for divestiture of a jointly
owned family home.
VI. OTHER AVAILABLE PROTECTIONS FOR
NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES
As the preceding sections revealed, state programs that have adopted
the expanded definition of "estate" threaten nontraditional families most
significantly. In these states, property held in joint tenancy can be
recovered following the death of a Medicaid long-term care recipient.
Nontraditional families are significantly less threatened in states that have
not adopted the expanded definition of "estate," since these programs only
recover against probate assets. Considering this problem of inequitable
treatment in Medicaid estate recovery practices, the following discussion
Id. (emphasis added).
122. The nature of a lien, and the threats, burdens, and obligations it necessarily places on a
homeowner, is explained in the following passage:
It stands as a charge upon [the homeowner's] property, a cloud upon the title to
his real estate, a blot upon his character as a citizen, and yet it is claimed it is "due
process of law," because if it is sought to enforce collection of such taxes by a suit
in court the taxpayer will have notice of such proceedings, and may then defend
against the prima facie case of guilt and indebtedness arbitrarily found against
him. All the other summary remedies for collection provided by law are open to
the treasurer, and may at any time be enforced; and, unless the taxpayer assumes
the burden of removing the cloud upon his title and the lien upon his property by
affirmative action, they stand as a menace to his credit and right of possession of
his property, and as "due process of law" because of his right to notice and
defense, provided the treasurer chooses to resort to the remedy of a suit in court.
Meyers v. Shields, 61 F. 713, 724 (N.D. Ohio 1894).
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notes and discusses the various means by which individuals may avoid the
harsh effects of these laws.
A. Universally-Applicable Protections Afforded Under State
Homestead Exemptions
Despite the significantly different treatment of traditional and
nontraditional families by most estate recovery programs, and although
many families are at risk of losing jointly owned family homes in those
states that have adopted the expanded definition of "estate," other
protections found elsewhere in the law can equalize somewhat the impacts
of estate recovery on traditional and nontraditional families. Estate
recovery programs in most states must yield to a statutory or state
constitutional homestead protection. These provisions exempt all or part
of the primary residence from attachment or seizure by creditors.'23 Since
the law treats the state as a creditor for estate recovery purposes,
homestead protections can substantially limit estate recovery efforts.'24
Some states, such as Florida 125 and Texas 126 protect the primary
residence in its entirety without reference to the home's economic value.
123. Thus, the use of TEFRA liens would obviously be prohibited, just as outright estate
recovery is impermissible in these states.
124. When an individual initially applies for Medicaid benefits, the home is not considered
an asset for spend-down purposes. Therefore, when a Medicaid recipient dies, the home is often the
only asset remaining in the estate. The federal government also recognizes this reality. In a report
discussing successful estate recovery programs, the Department of Health and Human Services
explained that the attachment of liens or outright sale of homes is an essential mode of recouping
some of the Medicaid expenditures associated with long-term care. Brown, supra note 71. While
the home is generally the most significant remaining asset, other commonly seized assets include
"checking accounts, savings accounts, and personal needs funds of nursing home patients." Id.
125. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (2003). The Florida homestead protection provides:
There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no
judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, .... the following property
owned by a head of family.., a homestead [and] personal property to the value
of one thousand dollars .... The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the
owner is survived by spouse or minor child, except the homestead may be devised
to the owner's spouse if there be no minor child. The owner of homestead real
estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage,
sale or gift and, if married, may by deed transfer the title to an estate by the
entirety with the spouse.
Id.
126. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon 2004) (codifying the Texas homestead
exemption, providing protection for the homestead up to various acreages - depending on the use
and nature of the property (i.e., rural vs. urban)).
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In these states, estate recovery is essentially impossible since the home is
typically the only asset remaining in a Medicaid beneficiary's estate.
127
Given that these protections apply to all homeowners, homestead laws in
these states provide a universal protection against estate recovery,
regardless of marital or familial status.
121
However, in most other states, a weaker homestead provision leaves a
substantially greater portion of the home within the grasp of estate
recovery. In these states, the homestead provision typically protects only
a fraction of the homeowner's equity in a principle residence. 129 The
Uniform Probate Code recommends a homestead protection of$15,000,130
while some states only shield up to $5,000 of equity.' Under these less
protective homestead laws, estate recovery programs may attach and
enforce against the home's value beyond the protected amount.
Nontraditional families would be divested of the unprotected portion of the
home, while the estate recovery program's familial exceptions would
continue to protect the residence so long as a surviving spouse or
dependent child is alive. Therefore, in many states, homestead laws do not
provide sufficient protections for nontraditional families, and other
protections are necessary.
B. Can Nontraditional Families Protect Themselves from the Harsh
Effects of Estate Recovery Laws?
One could argue that nontraditional families should be aware that many
laws hinge on marital status; perhaps it is unreasonable to claim that yet
127. See id. One scholar explained the legislative history of the homestead protection, finding
evidence that the amendment was passed in order to prevent Medicaid estate recovery in Florida.
See Miller, supra note 32, at 596-97.
128. Indeed, Arizona's statutory homestead exemption, which protects up to $100,000 of
equity in the homestead, articulates this point clearly: "Any person the age of eighteen or over,
married or single, who resides within the state may hold as a homestead exempt from attachment,
execution and forced sale, not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars in value ... " ARiz. REV.
STAT. § 33-110 1(A) (2004).
129. For example, in California, a statutory homestead exemption protects graduated amounts
of equity, beginning with $50,000 as the default amount. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.730
(West 2004). Higher amounts of equity will be protected if the home is owned by an elderly or
disabled person, or if a "family unit" resides there. However, even in these circumstances, the
highest amount of equity that the law will protect is $150,000, an amount that is significantly less
than average home values in some of California's more costly metropolitan areas.
130. UPC § 2-402 recommends a homestead protection of only $15,000. In some states that
protect the home to a certain dollar amount, a much higher ceiling is provided.
131. Alabama's homestead exemption protects only $5,000 of equity and up to 160 acres of
land. See ALA. CODE § 6-10-2 (2004).
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another example of the law's special treatment for married couples would
lead to unfair surprise.'32 Since nontraditional families can sometimes
obtain rights that turn on marital status through private contract, perhaps
the obligation to protect against the harsh effects of Medicaid estate
recovery should rest with those individuals who choose to reside in
nontraditional family arrangements.'33 While a thorough examination of
this position could form the basis of a separate article, the argument is
simply not applicable here. As the following discussion reveals, there is no
reasonable way for individuals in nontraditional families to protect against
this particular law's harsh effects.
In theory, one way to avoid estate recovery is to simply avoid receipt
of Medicaid long-term care benefits. However, this is much easier said
than done. Although individuals have the option to purchase long-term
care insurance or pay for services out of pocket, both alternatives are
costly and beyond the reach of many families - particularly fixed-income
retirees. 134 Hence, long-term care insurance and private pay arrangements
are the exception, not the norm. Additionally, the long-term care insurance
industry is highly unregulated, so that it is not even clear whether this
investment would necessarily provide full protection when long-term care
is needed. 135 Finally, while nontraditional families can place the home in
special trust arrangements in order to avoid recovery, this would be
classified as a transfer and must therefore be completed prior to the
relevant lookback period. In addition, the lengthy lookback period renders
this option unavailable to more recently formed nontraditional families,
and also makes it difficult for families to predict in advance precisely how
the property should be transferred in order to protect the home.'36 Finally,
given the overall lack of long-term care planning that occurs in the general
population, it may simply be unreasonable to expect meticulous advance
planning from any particular population segment. For all of these reasons,
132. See supra Part 1.
133. Seeid.
134. See supra Part 11.
135. For instance, an individual who has paid premiums for years can be refused coverage if,
in the early and undiagnosed stages of dementia, she neglects to pay and the policy lapses. When
this occurs, the senior would still have to turn to Medicaid despite her advance planning. For a
fascinating discussion of fraud in the long-term care insurance industry, see Richard Alexander,
Avoiding Fraud When Buying Long-Term Care Insurance: A Guide For Consumers and Their
Families, at http://consumerlawpage.com/article/insure.shtml (last visited May 6, 2004).
136. This is because estate recovery programs are evolving every year, and new laws are
emerging with each legislative session. Also, some trust arrangements may hinge on the couple's
ability to correctly predict who in the family will eventually require long-term care.
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the best solution is a legislative response, which is described in detail
below.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
As estate recovery efforts become more systematic, seniors living in
nontraditional family settings will invariably be impacted when loved ones
pass away following Medicaid-funded long-term care. These seniors will
not receive the protection from impoverishment and hardship that has been
afforded to those who reside in traditional family settings. As discussed
above, the homestead protection in most states only protects a portion of
the home's value, and presently there are no reasonable means by which
families can take proactive steps to protect the jointly owned home.
Finally, most states' undue hardship criteria are either highly restrictive or
overly vague, so that families cannot hinge financial well-being on this
source of relief.
One way for Congress to remedy the inequitable impact of Medicaid
estate recovery laws is to simply prevent recovery against the principal
residence.'37 Following the example of homestead exemption laws, such
a provision would be universally applicable and therefore not hinge on
marital or familial status. However, this would be an overly broad solution
to the problem, and would directly impair the ability of states to preserve
and recoup already overstretched Medicaid budgets. The recovery of assets
from the estates of decedent Medicaid beneficiaries advances admirable
and necessary governmental goals by protecting the integrity and reach of
the Medicaid program, and also discourages fraud and abuse by more
affluent Americans. Since the home is often the sole asset of decedent
Medicaid beneficiaries, it must be within the program's initial reach in
order to make estate recovery worthwhile.
As another option, Congress could amend the law to expand provisions
that postpone recovery beyond the spouse and dependent children. Such
an amendment would protect nontraditional family members and postpone
recovery until their death. 3 ' However, this is also a less desirable solution.
In order to overcome the problems explored in this Note, the provision
would need to include a very broad definition of "family member."
137. Frank, supra note 40, at 143 ("One way to minimize the impact of estate recovery would
be to exempt the homestead from recovery by recognizing that recovery of the home constitutes
an undue hardship to the surviving family").
138. Thus, the surviving nontraditional family member would receive what is essentially a life
estate in the home, and the state would recover the home upon the survivor's death.
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Unfortunately, any definition broad enough to protect the myriad forms of
nontraditional families would also be broad enough to invite substantial
abuse by those wishing to postpone or avoid estate recovery for purely
avaricious reasons. 1
39
For these reasons, the soundest solution would be an amendment to the
Social Security Act to require that states establish undue hardship criteria
that would protect nontraditional families from immediate divestiture of
the family home. A suitable undue hardship provision could either declare
its application to nontraditional family members, or it can be modeled after
the Pennsylvania example and simply list factors that would tend to protect
surviving nontraditional family members. 4 ' The person or persons
claiming protection under such a provision would receive the same
treatment as a legal spouse or dependent child: the state would permit
surviving nontraditional family members to continue residing in the home
until death, and would recover the Medicaid beneficiary's share of the
home from the estate of the last surviving claimant.
Since undue hardship can be determined through a quasi-judicial
process, there is far less likelihood of abuse if the problem is addressed in
this manner. In an administrative hearing, there is a greater opportunity for
the state to conduct fact-finding and detect fraudulent claims. The
individual claiming that he or she resided in and shared ownership of the
home as a nontraditional family member could be required to take an oath
in such a hearing, and the decision-maker would have an opportunity to
review evidence brought forward by the survivor to demonstrate the
existence of a familial bond. In such an inquiry, the factors considered bythe Braschi v. Stahl Associates141 court to determine whether two men in
a same-sex intimate relationship constituted a family would be highly
instrumental. The Braschi court explained that such a determination:
should be based upon an objective examination of the relationship
of the parties . . . [using] a number of factors, including the
139. Since the spousal and dependent child exemptions categorically preclude estate recovery,
any Medicaid applicant could name his or her roommate, relative, or friend as a "nontraditional
family member" in order to prevent any further estate recovery efforts by the state until that
person's death. In essence, such a provision would give the Medicaid beneficiary a virtually
limitless specific power of appointment over a life estate in the home, which he or she can exercise
at the time of initial application for Medicaid benefits.
140. See supra text accompanying note 97.
141. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). In Braschi, the surviving same-sex partner asserted his right
to remain in the couple's rent controlled apartment because although the apartment was only leased
in the decedent's name, Braschi was a "family member" and therefore entitled to assume the lease.
See id.
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exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional
and financial commitment, the manner in which the parties have
conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to society,
and the reliance placed upon one another for daily family
services. '42
Thus, in an undue hardship hearing of this sort, the surviving
nontraditional family member could demonstrate the existence of a
connection that rises to a level deserving of special protection by bringing
forward evidence that establishes most or all of the Braschi factors. 4 3 The
risk of fraud would be significantly reduced, since it would be difficult for
a more distant friend or associate to establish that he or she resided in the
home and shared a familial relationship with the decedent.'
While the use of more comprehensive undue hardship criteria could
provide some protections for nontraditional families, this is only one
possible solution. Ultimately, Congress must recognize and resolve the
problem of inequitable estate recovery laws in a manner that it deems most
suitable. Nevertheless, a rapid response is needed. In the continued
absence of protections for nontraditional families, it is not impossible to
envision a scenario where, despite his best efforts to protect survivors
through an express grant of survivorship rights, an ailing Medicaid
beneficiary must suffer to know that upon his last breath loved ones may
be left emotionally and financially devastated.
142. Id. at 55.
143. For instance, the surviving party could demonstrate that he resided in the home by
introducing phone and utility bills into evidence, or by certifying that he has been receiving mail
at the address for a certain length of time. Evidence of financial interdependency, such as joint
checking accounts, shared purchases, and reciprocal wills or life insurance policies would also be
demonstrative of a familial bond. Finally, the survivor can demonstrate the level of emotional
intimacy by evidencing that the nontraditional family took vacations together, entrusted each other
with confidential or sensitive information, and established bonds with each other's blood relatives.
144. In addition, the state could establish penalties for fraudulent claims.
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